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INTRODUCTION
In a marketing presentation to investors, real estate investment fund Airo
Capital Management described its vision for a new, multifamily residential
development in Baltimore, Maryland.1 The market-rate rental project
would include 423 residential units, 212 parking spaces, and “additional
amenities.”2 Full-color “design concept” photos depicted a rooftop bar; a
long outdoor pool glowing in night lights; a game room featuring retro PacMan machines and a grey pool table; and a mirrored gym full of
aspirational new exercise equipment.3
The proposed location was “in the heart of Baltimore City . . . and
minutes from Johns Hopkins, the University of Maryland, and Mercy
Medical Center.”4 According to the developer, the area is “one of
Baltimore’s fastest growing areas with new large-scale developments
surrounding the site underway.”5 The neighborhood has “consistently
attracted more tourists, higher incomes and greater retail spending
compared to inland locations,” and its recent population growth has been
fueled primarily by “well-educated millennials, with Baltimore’s highest
earning income brackets being clustered around the waterfront.”6
The neighborhood is also an Opportunity Zone, a specially designated
area where projects are eligible for tax-subsidized financing under a new
federal tax law.7 The Opportunity Zones law was originally pitched as a
tool to help fight urban poverty and improve distressed communities.8 But
nothing in the law prevents developers like Airo from forming a specialized
investment entity called an Opportunity Fund to finance its luxury project
with tax-subsidized capital. So, it did. Seeking to take advantage of the tax

1. See The Village at Fallsway: Multifamily Development, Baltimore, Maryland, AIRO
CAP.
MGMT.
1,
https://ce-heliumproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/fundmeeq/document/file/906a7977-c7a3-4e4784cd667a4de44919/NEW+BOOK+The+Village+at+Fallsway_Multifamily+Development_10.06
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8A8-AK6T] (last visited Sept. 23, 2021).
2. Id. at 3.
3. See id. at 23.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id.
7. See
Opportunity
Zones,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/28CU-TX5Q] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2021); see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-1.
8. Robert Frank, ‘Opportunity Zones’ Fall Short on Helping Low-Income
Communities,
Study
Finds,
CNBC
(June
17,
2020,
12:50
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/opportunity-zones-fall-short-on-helping-low-incomecommunities-study.html [https://perma.cc/AHP5-QQ4R].
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preference, Airo created an Opportunity Fund and began seeking
Opportunity Zone investors through an online platform that connects
developers with investors.9 At the time this Essay was written, Airo was
seeking $34,000,000 in Opportunity Fund equity to help finance the
$113,000,000 project.10
It is not hard to see why many anti-poverty advocates are skeptical of the
new Opportunity Zones tax preference and the tax incentive approach in
general. Yet, long before there were Opportunity Zones, there were New
Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs).11 Like Opportunity Zones, the federal
NMTC program subsidizes investment in low-income areas.12 And like
Opportunity Zones, the NMTC has been criticized for funding projects that
may be more likely to spur gentrification than to benefit low-income
communities.13 But unlike Opportunity Zones, the NMTC has often been
used to support a variety of impact-investment projects, including
community facilities like YMCAs; nonprofit activities like soup kitchens,
youth centers, and job training sites; and, sometimes, housing (always with
an affordable component).14 So far, there is little indication that
Opportunity Funds have been used to support many of these types of
projects.15

9. See
The
Village
at
Fallsway,
OPPORTUNITY
EXCH.,
https://www.theopportunityexchange.com/projectDetail/1148/
[https://perma.cc/C79CYV8Z] (last visited May 7, 2021).
10. Id.
11. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1; I.R.C. § 45D.
12. DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34402, NEW MARKETS
TAX CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45152.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7F48-WV35].
13. See generally Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits,
8 FLA. TAX REV. 214 (2007) (arguing the NMTC subsidizes gentrification).
14. See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
15. Due to low program transparency, it is difficult to know how many Opportunity
Funds are being used for mission-driven investment. It is clear that most Opportunity Fund
money is being used for real estate development. See Mary Burke Baker, Opportunity Zones
Aren’t Just for Real Estate Development, NAIOP (2019), https://www.naiop.org/Researchand-Publications/Magazine/2019/Spring-2019/Business-Trends/Opportunity-Zones-ArentJust-for-Real-Estate-Development [https://perma.cc/K29M-FTDR]. It is also clear that at
least some mission-driven investors exist, but that they have faced significant challenges
attracting funding. See BRETT THEODOS ET AL., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITY
ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: NINE OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF
INCENTIVE
TO
DATE
18
(2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-of-ozs-forequitable-development-projects_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J94-9UU7] (“A key challenge[]
smaller community-oriented high social impact projects have faced is the inability to attract
OZ capital at below-market returns.”). Google searches related to nonprofits and
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This Essay explains one reason why these two tax incentive programs
look so different: where the design of the NMTC creates opportunities for
nonprofits to participate in the impact-investment process, the design of the
Opportunity Zones law creates barriers. Nonprofit participation in NMTC
deals is supported by specific incentives for debt investment in low-income
communities, the use of tax credit monetization, and favorable treatment
under banking regulations. The absence of parallel features in the
Opportunity Zones context creates significant barriers to nonprofit
participation in Opportunity Zones deals. Ultimately, these barriers limit
the types of projects pursued by most Opportunity Funds.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Section I.A describes how the NMTC
has been used to subsidize mission-driven investment in projects that serve
low-income populations. It argues that one reason the NMTC program can
support mission-driven investment is that nonprofit organizations are
common program participants. Section I.B describes three ways that
nonprofits participate in NMTC deals as borrowers, nonprofit parents of
financial intermediaries, and leverage providers. Part II analyzes whether
similar opportunities exist for nonprofits to participate in Opportunity Zone
deals, and it argues that, for the most part, they do not. It identifies several
barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity Zone deals, including
statutory limitations that prohibit debt investment in low-income
communities, the absence of monetization, and uncertainty about how
Opportunity Zone investment will be treated under banking regulations.
This research is essential not only for understanding how structural features
of the Opportunity Zones law affect program outcomes but also for
informing the design of future place-based tax incentives.
I. MISSION-DRIVEN INVESTMENT AND THE NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT
A. Impact Investment and the NMTC
The phrase “place-based policy” refers to strategies that “direct capital
and resources to locales through a selection or designation process,”16 often
with the goal of alleviating poverty through mission-driven investment in
place.17 As used in this Essay, “mission-driven investment” refers
generally to investment by actors who are “driven primarily by a

Opportunity Zones reveal some commentary and marketing materials but no data to suggest
that Opportunity Funds are engaging nonprofits with any regularity.
16. Edward W. De Barbieri, Supporting Small Businesses in Place, 48 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2021).
17. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community
Development Policy Essay, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2009).
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community development mission” and who seek “to engage residents and
local leaders in decisionmaking about development in their
communities.”18 An important goal of placed-based policy is increasing
the rate and amount of mission-driven investment. This investment may
include affordable housing construction or other projects to rehabilitate the
built environment or improve local amenities.
In theory, either for-profit or nonprofit investors may participate in
mission-driven investment. On the for-profit side, mission-driven placebased investment is a focus of many “social impact investors,” who claim
to marry private profits and public benefits in “a ‘win win’ arrangement
that will allow private investors to solve pressing social problems while
simultaneously accruing a market or near-market rate of financial return.”19
Social impact investment is often supported by public policies, including
the use of place-based tax incentives like the Opportunity Zones incentive,
which provide tax-based subsidies to private investors who invest in lowincome areas.20
However, some researchers have argued that social impact investment
often fails to deliver the promised benefits to low-income communities.21
For example, one scholar argues that the “strategy extends the imposition
of market rather than community-driven logics of poverty management,
reproducing and legitimating a financialized system . . . that reproduces
impoverishment instead of eradicating it.”22 Similarly, the Opportunity
Zones law has been described as “extractive,” whereby profit-seeking
investors capture more value from low-income communities than they
confer to them.23 Such critiques cast doubt on whether incentives like
Opportunity Zones can effectively promote mission-driven investment by
for-profit taxpayers.
Experience with the NMTC, however, suggests that place-based tax
incentives can effectively promote mission-driven investment by for-profit

18. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 15, at V.
19. Emily Rosenman, Capital and Conscience: Poverty Management and the
Financialization of Good Intentions in the San Francisco Bay Area, 40 URB. GEOGRAPHY
1124, 1125 (2019).
20. See Valerie Grunduski & Casey Veach, Opportunity Zones Offer Tax Incentives to
Impact Investors, PLANTE MORAN (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.plantemoran.com/exploreour-thinking/insight/2018/09/opportunity-zones-offer-tax-incentives-to-impact-investors
[https://perma.cc/Z6QZ-NNRR].
21. See Rosenman, supra note 19, at 1126.
22. Id. (internal citations omitted).
23. See Bruce Katz & Ross Baird, From Extractive Investment to Community Wealth,
PUB. SQUARE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2019/09/09/extractiveinvestment-community-wealth [https://perma.cc/R8YJ-XDGV].
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taxpayers — provided that the incentives create meaningful opportunities
for nonprofits to participate in the transactions. Here, some background
may be helpful. The NMTC was enacted in 2000 to provide an incentive
for investment in low-income areas.24 The tax credit is claimed by forprofit investors who contribute capital for use in projects located in lowincome areas.25 As described below, the size of the tax credit equals 39%
of the value of the investor’s qualified equity investments, claimed over a
seven-year period.26 These tax credits serve as an incentive to investors
and a capital subsidy to developers and businesses.27 The mechanism by
which the tax credits are delivered, however, is somewhat complicated.
The complexity relates to annual limitations placed on the program’s
size28 and the administration of the tax credits. The NMTC is
administered by the Community Development Financial Institutions
(CDFI) Fund, which is an office within the Department of Treasury.29 The
CDFI Fund permits entities that it certifies as Community Development
Entities (CDEs) to apply for NMTC allocations.30 As explained below, the
CDEs act as intermediaries between investors and project developers or
businesses in low-income communities, and as between investors and the
CDFI Fund.
Specifically, CDEs apply for tax credit allocations through a competitive
application process administered by the CDFI Fund.31 If a CDE receives
an award, it solicits investors who make so-called qualifying equity

24. See I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A); see also Groves, supra note 13, at 217−18.
25. Groves, supra note 13, at 217−18.
26. For each of the first three years, the investor receives a credit equal to 5% of the
total amount paid for the capital interest, and for the remaining four years it receives 6%
annually. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, NEW MARKET TAX CREDIT BASICS 1 (2013),
http://services.housingonline.com/nhra_images/NMTC%20Basics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G348-PWXG] [hereinafter NMTC BASICS]. Note that the investor does not
own a direct interest in the project and, therefore, the costs of the project do not affect the
credit amount. Id.
27. Michael Eickhoff & Steve Carter, Accessing Capital Through the New Markets Tax
Credit Program, 29 J. ST. TAX’N 17, 17 (2011) (explaining that the company receives a
capital contribution and the investor receives a tax break).
28. In 2020, the law authorized $5 billion in tax credits to be allocated that year among
projects nationwide. Notice of Allocation Availability (NOAA) Inviting Applications for the
Calendar Year (CY) 2020 Allocation Round of the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC)
Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 59,853, 59,853 (Sept. 23, 2020).
29. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 12, at 1.
30. CDE
Certification,
CMTY.
DEV.
FIN.
INST.
FUND,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/certification/cde
[https://perma.cc/5LJZQKBV] (last visited July 14, 2021).
31. See MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 12, at 2.
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investments (QEIs) in the CDE.32 The CDE is required to use that capital
to make debt or equity investments in development projects or businesses
in low-income communities.33 The phrase “low-income community” is
defined by statute and generally includes census tracts that have at least a
20% poverty rate or have a tract median income that does not exceed 80%
of the area’s median income.34
Like the newer Opportunity Zones incentive, the NMTC has long been
criticized for failing to ensure that benefits flow to residents of low-income
communities. In my own research, I have described how developer lobbies
and powerful market actors have helped drive place-based investment tax
incentives, including the NMTC.35 The NMTC helps provide large
infusions of capital into projects, enabling new construction, rehabilitation,
and large development projects. Apart from the location requirements, the
statute itself places few restrictions on the types of projects that can be
supported through the program, which has been blamed for subsidizing
projects like museums and opera houses that are not well targeted to benefit
low-income communities.36
Nevertheless, my analysis provides strong evidence that the NMTC has
successfully promoted mission-driven investment that is likely to benefit
low-income communities. Specifically, I collected the addresses of 443
NMTC projects funded between 2003 and 2018 in five cities (Chicago, Los
Angeles, New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia).37 I then used a
combination of Google satellite images, Google Maps, and general Google
searches of the addresses to determine what businesses or organizations
occupied the properties at those locations as of 2019.38 This method
yielded project-level data that was not otherwise available, providing new
insight into how NMTC financing has been used. For example, data

32. See id. at 1. This investment immediately entitles the investor to tax credits equal to
39 cents per dollar of QEI, to be earned over a seven-year period. I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2)–(3).
33. I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(B).
34. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1).
35. See Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment
Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745,
791 (2019).
36. See Groves, supra note 13, at 225.
37. Michelle D. Layser, NMTC Project Types [hereinafter Layser, NMTC Project
Types],
https://libguides.law.illinois.edu/ld.php?content_id=62879347
[https://perma.cc/A285-NWHN] (last updated July 16, 2019) (on file with University of
Illinois College of Law Library Research Guides). Project addresses were obtained from a
dataset maintained by the private accounting firm Novogradac LLP. See QLICIs by State,
NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/new-markets-tax-credits/qlicisstate [https://perma.cc/VV35-6JH3] (last visited May 10, 2021).
38. See Layser, NMTC Project Types, supra note 37.

1138

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

available from the CDFI Fund described many projects simply as
“redevelopment,”39 but this method shed light on how the redeveloped
property was being used — whether as a large retail store like Target, a
community center like the YMCA, a medical facility, or a general office
space.
The projects were described in detail and hand coded to categorize the
type of project at that location.40 Each project was assigned a single
code.41 This method revealed that the most frequent types of project in the
sample were education facilities (21%), most of which were charter
schools.42 The next most frequently appearing project types were mixeduse apartments and condos (12%), retail and restaurants (9%), medical
facilities (11%), and homeless and social services (10%).43
While the impact of any given project will depend on how well the
project advances solutions to problems faced by a community,44 two points
are clear from the data: not all of the projects supported by the NMTC
program were likely to generate significant profit for investors, and many
appeared to be predominantly mission-driven. Examples of such missiondriven investment included homeless shelters, job training centers for lowincome people, employment agencies for low-income people, religious
missions, social-services nonprofits, family/youth services, food kitchens,
disability support services, anti-poverty organizations, housing assistance
organizations, nonprofit law centers, homeless services organizations, antiaddiction nonprofits, and assisted living facilities. Few, if any, of these
projects are the type normally pursued by the for-profit sector.

39. The CDFI fund releases public data annually, but the data includes only minimal
information about the types of projects that have been funded. See CDFI Fund, Data
Releases, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/documents/data-releases
[https://perma.cc/KT8W-PM5U] (last visited May 10, 2021). For example, a release may
describe a project as “Business Financing” or “Real Estate-Rehabilitation-Commercial,” but
it does not describe the type of business that received financing or the type of commercial
development. See, e.g., CDFI Fund, NMTC Public Data Release: 2003–2019 Data File,
CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/202105/FY_2020_NMTC_Public_Data_Release.xlsx
[https://perma.cc/RHA3-DSW7] (last
visited May 10, 2021).
40. The following 12 codes were used: Apartment/Condos; Community Centers;
Education; Grocery; Homeless/Social Services; Manufacturing/Wholesale; Medical;
Museum/Theater/Arts; Office Space; Retail/Restaurants; Other; Unknown. The table in
Appendix A describes the types of projects included under each code heading. Data on file
with University of Illinois College of Law Library. See supra note 38.
41. See Layser, NMTC Project Types, supra note 37.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Michelle D. Layser, How Place-Based Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic
Inequality, 74 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 42).
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Most likely, the results of this analysis of NMTC projects suggest that
nonprofit organizations have participated in many deals, helping to ensure
that the NMTC promotes mission-driven investment that is likely to benefit
low-income communities. The remainder of this Essay is concerned
primarily with identifying ways that the NMTC and Opportunity Zone
incentives do — and do not — create opportunities for nonprofits to
participate in tax-subsidized transactions. The next Section describes how
the NMTC creates opportunities for nonprofits to participate in deals, and
later parts will examine how the different design of the Opportunity Zones
incentive creates barriers to nonprofit participation.
B. Opportunities for Nonprofit Participation Created by the NMTC
Notwithstanding the recent popularity of social impact investment,
mission-driven investment has traditionally been the domain of the
nonprofit sector.45
However, many nonprofits are tax-exempt
organizations with little need for tax deductions and credits.46 This fact
presents a challenge when designing tax incentives to promote missiondriven investment. How can tax preferences be used to support the
activities of nonprofits that have little use for tax breaks? The NMTC
solves this problem by providing tax preferences to for-profit investors who
contribute to projects that are — at least sometimes — consistent with the
missions of tax-exempt nonprofits. Nonprofits participate in these missiondriven NMTC deals as borrowers, as the nonprofit parents of financial
intermediaries, and as leverage providers. As this Section explains, these
roles for nonprofit participation are supported by specific features of the
law that create incentives for debt investment in low-income communities,
opportunities for tax credit monetization, and favorable treatment under
banking regulations.

45. See Michelle J. Stecker, Revolutionizing the Nonprofit Sector Through Social
Entrepreneurship, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 349, 350−52 (2014) (explaining that the “nonprofit
sector provides goods and services that public sector governmental actors do not provide,
and that private for-profit entities do not adequately — or are not able to — provide,” and
that “social entrepreneurship” is a more recent development).
46. Id. at 350. For this reason, tax-based subsidies for charities have generally taken the
form of tax preferences for taxable donors. For example, the charitable donations deduction,
which is claimed by taxpayers who donate to tax-exempt charities, presumably functions
partly as an incentive — to encourage generous donations or investments that would not
otherwise occur — and partly as a subsidy to nonprofit entities that produce pro-social
goods and services. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23–25 (2011) (distinguishing between subsidies and incentives and
explaining that “[i]f the deduction is an incentive that causes donors to increase their gifts
by at least as much as the tax benefit, it is an incentive to the donor and a subsidy to [the]
charity” (internal citations omitted)).
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1. Debt Investment Incentives Create Opportunities for
Nonprofit Borrowers
As explained above, the NMTC statute requires CDEs that receive
NMTC allocations to invest in qualified low-income community
investments. The statutory definition of qualified low-income community
investment includes “any capital or equity investment in, or loan to, any
qualified active low-income community business.”47 However, as a
practical matter, almost all qualified low-income community investments
take the form of a loan.48 In other words, the most common types of
investment subsidized by the NMTC are loans (usually with below-marketrate interest) to a business or developer,49 some of which are extended to
nonprofit borrowers.50 Nonprofits can use these loans to pursue their
charitable activities.51 It is likely that many of the mission-driven projects
described above — e.g., homeless shelters, food kitchens, religious
missions — reflect loans made directly to nonprofit organizations.52
Nonprofits hoping to receive low-interest loans subsidized through the
NMTC program may reach out directly to CDEs, or they may work with
consultants who connect them with CDEs that might fund their projects.53
If a nonprofit’s project is consistent with the CDE’s investment strategy,
the CDE may be willing to loan capital to the nonprofit at below-market
rates.54 Nonprofits across the United States have recently used NMTCsubsidized capital to fund a wide array of projects. For example, Wheeler
Mission Center for Women and Children in Indianapolis is expanding its

47. I.R.C. § 45D(d)(1)(A).
48. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT:
UNLOCKING
INVESTMENT
POTENTIAL
7
(2013),
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/occ_insights_nmtc_unlocking_invest
ment_potential_0613.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KC-DUHJ].
49. See id. at 3 n.16.
50. See Michael I. Sanders, How Nonprofit Organizations Can Use the New Markets
Tax
Credit,
BLANK
ROME
LLP
8–9
(2009),
https://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/publications//27E9C61B6D14DB754B19C370C5323
1B8.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GFK-3JUF].
51. See id. at 15–16.
52. See supra notes 40−43 and accompanying text.
53. See Gordon Goldie & Terri Salas, New Markets Tax Credits Can Fill the Gap in
Your Capital Campaign Caused by COVID-19, PLANTE MORAN (June 22, 2020),
https://www.plantemoran.com/explore-our-thinking/insight/2020/06/new-markets-taxcredits-can-fill-the-gap-in-your-capital-campaign [https://perma.cc/A7ED-25W8].
54. NMTC BASICS, supra note 26, at 2 (explaining that CDEs often make loans at below
market rates).
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facilities to serve the homeless population in Indiana.55 In Las Vegas, the
nonprofit Strong Start Academy Wardelle plans to use NMTC-subsidized
capital “to develop and construct certain improvements to be operated as a
childhood education facility, a physical and mental health wellness center,
and other community facilities.”56 Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic,
Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank used NMTC funding to help
expand its food bank facilities.57
2. Tax Credit Monetization Makes Mission-Driven
Investment “Profitable”
In addition to participating in NMTC transactions on the borrower-side
of the transaction, nonprofits also participate by facilitating the investment
process itself. In this capacity, a nonprofit may participate (i) as the
nonprofit parent of a CDE subsidiary or (ii) as leverage providers to
support for-profit equity investment. In both cases, the CDE’s qualifying
low-income community investment must be consistent with the nonprofits’
tax-exempt purposes. Often, such mission-driven investment is not likely
to generate significant profit for investors. In fact, most NMTC investors
do not expect the underlying projects to generate significant economic
returns. Why, then, do for-profit investors participate in these missiondriven deals? One reason is that a technique called tax credit monetization
makes mission-driven investment “profitable.”
Tax credit monetization refers to the process by which a future stream of
value from anticipated tax credits is converted into dollars that can be used
currently.58 This is accomplished when an investor obtains the rights to
claim the tax credits when they are available.59 In the context of the
NMTC, when investors make a qualified equity investment, they
effectively purchase the right to claim NMTCs as they are earned. Under
the statute, the tax credit always equals 39 cents per dollar of qualified

55. See Wheeler Center for Women & Children (2020), NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL.,
https://nmtccoalition.org/project/wheeler-center-for-women-children/
[https://perma.cc/TP3A-Z8KM] (last visited June 24, 2021).
56. Strong Start Academy Wardelle (2020), NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL.,
https://nmtccoalition.org/project/strong-start-academy-wardelle/
[https://perma.cc/5NV68YYB] (last visited June 24, 2021).
57. See Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank (2020), NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT
COAL.,
https://nmtccoalition.org/project/greater-pittsburgh-community-food-bank/
[https://perma.cc/K497-3UYF] (last visited June 24, 2021).
58. See Thomas W. Giegerich, The Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA. TAX
REV. 709, 769−71 (2012).
59. Id.
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equity investment, earned over a seven-year period.60 This amount
provides a 5% return on investment for the first three years and a 6% return
on investment for the last four years — a rate of return that, standing alone,
would be insufficient to motivate most investors.61
The tax credit monetization process provides an opportunity for
investors to structure their investments in ways that increase the rate of
return.62 Specifically, investors add leverage to the tax credit monetization
structure.63 If enough leverage is added, investors can profit from the tax
credits themselves, even if a CDE’s underlying investments are
unprofitable.64 To do this, investors form a leverage fund and make the
qualified equity contribution through the fund.65 In this way, the investor
can “purchase” each dollar of (tax credit generating) qualified equity
investment at a discount. NMTC “pricing” is generally quoted in terms of
this discount.66 In 2021, NMTC pricing is currently 74 cents per credit in
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.67 The balance of the qualified
equity investment is financed through leverage.68
The leveraged monetization technique is best illustrated with an
example.69 Assume that an investor creates a leverage fund. A Lender
loans $0.69 to the fund, and the investor contributes $0.31 of equity to the
fund, yielding one dollar of capital to be contributed to a CDE. The fund
then contributes that dollar to a CDE as a qualified equity investment,
which generates $0.39 of tax credits to be claimed by the investor. In other
words, the equity investor paid just under 80 cents per credit ($0.31
invested / $0.39 credit = $0.795).
The CDE uses that dollar of investment to make a below-market-rate
loan to a business or organization that serves a low-income community.
The leverage fund will use any economic returns from interest collected on
60. NMTC BASICS, supra note 26, at 3.
61. See I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2).
62. Giegerich, supra note 58, at 771 (explaining that in both LIHTC and NMTC deals,
tax monetization is used to provide investors with a targeted internal rate of return).
63. See Eickhoff & Carter, supra note 27, at 77.
64. See New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program Summary, SBFRIEDMAN [hereinafter
SBFRIEDMAN],
https://sbfriedman.com/sites/default/files/
download/NMTC%20Guide%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6Y8-5KM4] (last visited Sept.
23, 2021).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Brad Elphick, How the Pandemic Has Affected NMTC Equity Pricing and
Investments, 12 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS 1 (2021).
68. See SBFRIEDMAN, supra note 64, at 2.
69. This example is adapted from a hypothetical described in SBF RIEDMAN, supra note
64, at 2.
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the loan to pay debt service to the Lender, leaving little, if any, economic
returns for the investor.70 However, the entire value of the tax credits
($0.39) will flow to the investor (who initially contributed only $0.31).71 In
other words, the value of the tax credits to the investor is 125% of its
original equity contribution. Even if the contribution is never repaid, the
investor would receive a 25% rate of return on the investment — generated
solely from the tax credits — over the seven-year period. Through
structures like these, investors can derive an acceptable rate of return
entirely from the tax credits themselves, and in some cases the initial equity
contribution may not even need to be repaid.72 The amount of leverage
required depends on the deal, and the “tax credit markets [have] historically
set a price of 70 to 80 cents per dollar of tax credit,” with a lower valuation
in years when credit markets are tight and corporate profits are small.73
The table in Appendix B shows the rates of return that investors derive
solely from the tax credits, comparing the unleveraged structure to the
leveraged example presented above. Note that under both structures, the
qualified equity investment is $1 and generates the same 39 cent return. By
adding leverage, however, an investor can increase the rate of return from
5–6% annually to 16–19% annually.
These monetization structures create at least two significant
opportunities for nonprofit organizations to participate in NMTC deals.
First, a nonprofit can create a for-profit subsidiary certified as a CDE.74
The subsidiary CDE can receive NMTC allocations and solicit qualified
equity investments from for-profit investors to help fund its mission-driven
projects. Even though the CDE’s investments may be low profit, these
investors may be willing to invest through a leverage fund.75 Because tax
credit monetization can be used to provide investors with an acceptable rate
of return, nonprofit-controlled CDEs are able to attract investors for their
mission-driven projects.
Second, a nonprofit may participate as the leverage-provider in the
monetization structure. In this structure, the for-profit investor creates a
leverage fund (as described above) and a nonprofit provides the leverage.76
The nonprofit has the least control over its investment when it functions as
the leverage-provider; however, the CDE must provide legal assurance to

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
See MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 12, at 7.
See Sanders, supra note 50, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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the nonprofit that its activities will be consistent with the nonprofit’s
charitable purpose.77 As such, the participation of a nonprofit in these
deals increases the likelihood that the NMTC will be used to subsidize
mission-driven projects. Figure 1 in Appendix C describes the three roles
that nonprofits play in NMTC deals: (1) as borrowers of tax-subsidized
loans extended by CDEs, (2) as the nonprofit parent of a CDE, and (3) as a
leverage-provider to facilitate a leveraged tax equity investment.
3. Financial Regulations Make Low-Profit Mission-Driven
Investment Worthwhile
Whether a nonprofit participates as a borrower, the parent of a CDE, or
as a leverage provider, the CDE’s qualified low-income community
investments must be consistent with the nonprofit’s tax-exempt purpose. In
many cases, that means that an investor must be willing to invest indirectly
in a project that is unlikely to generate significant economic returns. As
this Section has demonstrated, many for-profit investors are willing to take
this risk because they derive value from the NMTC itself, even when the
underlying investment is not profitable. However, one additional feature of
the NMTC legal framework is also worth noting; NMTC investment is
promoted by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). 78
The CRA requires financial institutions to extend credit and invest in
low-income communities within their assessment areas.79 Financial
institutions that fail to meet their CRA obligations may lose privileges,
such as the right to expand their business.80 Since financial institutions
receive CRA “credit” for NMTC investments, they are often willing and

77. Id.
78. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–08. The CRA requires financial institutions to invest in the lowincome communities they service. See id. § 2903. Today, nearly all investment in taxsubsidized affordable housing and community development projects comes from financial
institutions motivated primarily by the CRA. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV.,
THE DISRUPTION OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES,
RESPONSES,
AND
PROPOSED
CORRECTIVES
19
(2009),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/disruption_of_the_lihtc_program_2
009_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA4Z-AMKA] (explaining that the LIHTC investor market has
narrowed over time to include primarily financial institutions motivated by the CRA); see
also Investor Trends, NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., https://nmtccoalition.org/progressreport-2019/investor-trends/ [https://perma.cc/4TTX-K8UL] (last visited July 14, 2021)
(noting that most NMTC investors are financial institutions subject to the CRA and
motivated by CRA compliance).
79. Cassandra Jones Havard, The Community Reinvestment Act, Banks, and the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit Investment, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 415, 418
(2017).
80. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.02 (2020).
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able to invest in NMTC projects, even if the expected rate of return is
relatively low.81 In fact, the overwhelming majority of NMTC investors
are seeking credit under the CRA.82
Here, it is worth noting that in the broader context of affordable housing
and community development, financial institutions are often willing to
invest in CRA-eligible projects even if they do not expect the investment to
be profitable. A striking example of this is sometimes seen in the context
of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which employs
monetization structures similar to those used to monetize the NMTC.83 As
in the case of the NMTC, LIHTC investors usually size their tax credit
investments to ensure a positive return on their investment.84 In effect,
they purchase the tax credits at a discount, thereby building in an
acceptable rate of return.85
However, during some particularly competitive periods, some LITHC
investors have been willing to purchase LIHTCs at a premium — paying
more than a dollar for each dollar of anticipated tax credits.86 These
investors know from the outset that their investment is likely to be a
money-loser. Yet, these LIHTC investors are not motivated by profits;
they are motivated by the CRA and the promise that they will receive CRA
credit for investing in affordable housing.87
Most NMTC investors are also motivated by the CRA.88 While these
investors would presumably prefer to receive a positive return on their
investment, they may be willing to invest in low-profit projects because
CRA compliance alone has value. It seems likely that the CRA may affect

81. See MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., URB. INST., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC)
PROGRAM
EVALUATION
65–66
(2013),
https://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/publication/24211/412958-new-markets-tax-credit-nmtc-programevaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ4Y-6WCA].
82. Id. at 66.
83. Giegerich, supra note 58, at 771.
84. See H. Blair Kincer & Mark O’Meara, A Look at the LIHTC: Past Pricing Trends,
the Current Market and Future Concerns, 11 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS 1, 3 (2020)
(describing LIHTC pricing trends over time and explaining that, in most markets, LIHTCs
are purchased at discounted prices).
85. Id.
86. See Donna Kimura, LIHTC Prices Climb and Climb, AFFORDABLE HOUS. FIN. (Aug.
16,
2016),
http://www.housingfinance.com/Finance/lihtc-prices-climb-and-climb_o
[https://perma.cc/TX2F-ZQXU] (describing LIHTC pricing at $1.03 per $1 of tax credit in
August 2016); see also Kincer & O’Meara, supra note 84, at 3 (describing CRA-driving
LIHTC pricing between $1.05 and $1.10 per dollar of credit prior to the 2017 tax reform
legislation).
87. Kincer & O’Meara, supra note 84.
88. NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL., supra note 78.
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NMTC pricing in the same way that it increases LIHTC pricing, reflecting
investors’ willingness to accept lower rates of return. In other words, the
favorable treatment under the CRA may help make mission-driven
investment worth it, even if it does not generate much profit.
In sum, several features of the NMTC create opportunities for nonprofits
to participate in tax credit deals. These include the inclusion of loans
among qualified low-income community investments, the use of
monetization structures, and the availability of CRA credit for NMTC
investment. Theoretically, similar structures could be used by nonprofits to
take advantage of tax-subsidized financing raised by Opportunity Funds.
However, the structure of the incentive — and its current status under the
CRA — make it much more difficult for nonprofits to participate in
Opportunity Zones deals. The next Part will analyze the barriers to
nonprofit participation in Opportunity Zones transactions. Ultimately,
these barriers limit the capacity of the Opportunity Zones law to support
mission-driven projects.
II. NONPROFIT PARTICIPATION IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES DEALS
This Essay has demonstrated that the NMTC has been used to promote
mission-driven investment by providing opportunities for nonprofits to
participate in NMTC deals. Early research suggests that similar missiondriven investment is less common in the context of Opportunity Zones
deals.89 A recent study showed that Opportunity Zone investment is
“overwhelmingly concentrated in equity investments in businesses that
specialize in real estate, construction, and finance.”90 This investment
“gravitates toward tracts with relatively higher educational attainment,
income, density, and pre-existing upward income and population growth
trends,”91 and mission-driven real estate investment, like affordable
housing, is relatively uncommon.92
One reason that Opportunity Zone investment differs so dramatically
from NMTC investment is that fewer opportunities exist for nonprofits to
participate in Opportunity Zones deals. In the NMTC context, several

89. See Patrick Kennedy & Harrison Wheeler, Neighborhood-Level Investment from the
U.S. Opportunity Zone Program: Early Evidence 4 (U.S. Cong. Joint Comm. on Tax’n,
Working
Paper,
2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
57a3c0fcd482e9189b09e101/t/607893b915858d7bd0d198ba/1618514881004/oz_kennedy_
wheeler.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JCM-NX8B].
90. Id.
91. Id. at 9.
92. See Michelle D. Layser, Financing Affordable Housing Through Opportunity Zones,
19 PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Layser, Financing Affordable Housing].
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features of the law create opportunities for nonprofit participation,
including incentives for debt investment in low-income communities, its
suitability for monetization, and favorable treatment under the CRA. In
contrast, this Part identifies several barriers to nonprofit participation in
Opportunity Zones deals, including the requirement that Opportunity Funds
make equity investments in Opportunity Zones, the absence of
monetization, and uncertainty surrounding the CRA. As a result, fewer
opportunities exist for nonprofits to participate in Opportunity Zones
transactions.
A. Comparing Opportunity Zones to NMTC
1. Capital Gains Relief Versus Tax Credits
To understand the barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity
Zones transactions, it is helpful to review the structure of the law itself,
including ways that the Opportunity Zones incentive differs from the
NMTC. The first key distinction is that, where the NMTC uses tax credits
to promote development in low-income areas, the Opportunity Zones
incentive takes the form of tax deferrals and exemptions. Specifically, the
Opportunity Zones law provides three possible tax benefits for taxpayers
who contribute to Opportunity Funds, all of which confer capital gains tax
relief.93
Normally, when an appreciated asset is sold, the profits — called capital
gains — are subject to tax at capital gains rates, which in recent years
have ranged from 0% to 28%.94 The first tax benefit under the Opportunity
Zones law is to permit taxpayers to defer paying tax on their capital gains
from an asset sale until December 31, 2026, provided that they are
contributed to an Opportunity Fund within 180 days of the sale and all
other statutory requirements are met.95 The second possible tax benefit is
the partial exclusion of pre-contribution capital gains. To receive this
benefit, taxpayers must leave their money in the fund for specified holding
periods.96 Depending on when the taxpayer invested in the fund and how

93. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1) (“In the case of gain from the sale to, or exchange with,
an unrelated person of any property held by the taxpayer, at the election of the taxpayer —
[] gross income for the taxable year shall not include so much of such gain as does not
exceed the aggregate amount invested by the taxpayer in a qualified opportunity fund during
the 180-day period beginning on the date of such sale or exchange . . . .”).
94. See id. § 1(h).
95. See id. § 1400Z-2(b).
96. Specifically, a taxpayer who remains invested in the fund for five years may
increase its basis by 10%. A taxpayer who remains invested in the fund for seven years may
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long the investment was held, the statute provides for the exemption of up
to 15% of pre-contribution capital gains.97 The third — and potentially
most significant — benefit is the total exclusion of post-contribution gains
from investments held in an Opportunity Fund for at least ten years.98
These three benefits are unlimited in size and potentially available to any
taxpayer who invests in an Opportunity Fund.99
While the initial deferral and potential to partially exclude precontribution capital gains are attractive incentives, it is worth noting that a
successful project that generates post-investment gains, compounded over
ten years, could provide taxpayers with tax-free returns that eclipse the tax
savings associated with the initial deferral. Taxpayers who anticipate
significant profits from an investment may find this third benefit
particularly attractive. In contrast, taxpayers who do not expect their
investment to generate significant profit — such as those pursuing missiondriven investment like affordable housing — may not be as motivated by
the third incentive. As a result, the Opportunity Zones law provides the
strongest incentive package to taxpayers who plan to pursue highly
profitable projects.

increase its basis by an additional 5% (note that this benefit is only available to taxpayers
who invested by the end of 2019). Understanding these benefits requires some familiarity
with the tax basis rules applicable to Opportunity Funds. Under the rules, taxpayers receive
zero basis for their initial investment in Opportunity Funds. See id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(i).
The practical effect of this rule is that if a taxpayer invests $100 in an Opportunity Fund
(thereby receiving $0 basis) and then sells its fund interest for $100, the taxpayer would
immediately recognize $100 in capital gains. See id. §§ 741, 1001. Without this rule, a
taxpayer would ordinarily receive $100 basis for that same investment, allowing the investor
to sell the interest for zero gain and permanently avoid the capital gains tax. See id. §§
358(a)(1), 722. In the same way, the basis step-up rules allow the taxpayers to permanently
exclude tax on the pre-contribution gains to the extent of the step-up.
97. See id. §§ 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii)−(iv).
98. In other words, taxpayers are always required to include at least 85% of capital gains
from the initial asset sale in 2026, but to the extent that their investment in the Opportunity
Fund appreciated, those gains are eligible for complete exclusion after ten years. The cost to
the Treasury of this appreciation exclusion was not included in the original expense estimates
for the law since it fell outside the ten-year budget window; however, this feature of the law
could ultimately deliver significant tax breaks to third-party investors who hold their
investments for the full ten-year period. See SEAN LOWRY & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R45152, TAX INCENTIVES FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES 9 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45152.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKT9-9RXS].
99. This structure stands in sharp contrast to the NMTC. As mentioned, the law caps the
amount of NMTCs that can be allocated each year, and the credits are therefore awarded to
eligible entities by the government on a competitive basis. See I.R.C. § 45D.
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2. Equity Subsidy Versus Debt Subsidy
To receive the capital gains relief described above, the taxpayer must
invest in a Qualified Opportunity Fund that meets statutory requirements
related to asset holdings. To qualify under the statute, Opportunity Funds
must either (i) directly own property located in the zones (Opportunity Zone
Business Property) or (ii) own such property indirectly through entities that
that own a qualified opportunity zone business.100 In either case, the key is
that an Opportunity Fund is required to own — directly or indirectly —
property located in an Opportunity Zone. A fund cannot meet its asset
holding requirements by making debt investments. In other words, unlike
the NMTC, which is primarily used to subsidize debt investment, the
Opportunity Zones law was designed to subsidize equity investment in lowincome areas.101
***
These two structural differences between the NMTC and Opportunity
Zones incentive help ensure that the tax incentives are not duplicative, and
they help the Opportunity Zones incentive reach a different pool of
potential investors than the NMTC can reach. However, these differences
also present distinct barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity
Zones deals. As the remainder of this Part will show, nonprofit
participation in Opportunity Zone deals is likely chilled by the equity
investment requirement, the absence of monetization, and uncertainty about
how Opportunity Zone investments will be treated under the CRA.
B. Barriers to Participation in Opportunity Zones Deals
1. Equity Investment Requirement
The requirement that Opportunity Funds make equity investments
presents a significant barrier to using Opportunity Funds to support the
activities of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. Many nonprofits are
organized and operated as tax-exempt organizations under section

100. If the fund owns property directly, then substantially all (90%) of the fund’s assets
must be comprised of property located in the Opportunity Zone. See 26 C.F.R. §§
1.1400Z2(d)-1(b)(1)(i), 1.1400Z2(d)-2(d)(3)(i) (2020). If it owns property indirectly, then
substantially all (70%) of the entity’s assets must be located in an Opportunity Zone. See id.
§§ 1.1400Z2(d)-1(b)(1)(ii), (d)(2) (2020).
101. John Sciarretti, Michael Novogradac & Peter Lawrence, New Opportunity Zones
Could Be Used to Finance Rental Housing, NOVOGRADAC (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/new-opportunity-zones-could-be-usedfinance-rental-housing [https://perma.cc/T67Y-QKSN].
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501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.102 This category of nonprofits is
commonly referred to as “charitable organizations.”103 Among the
requirements applicable to a charitable organization is that no part of the
organization’s net earnings may “inure[] to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.”104 As a practical matter, the anti-inurement
requirement means that charitable organizations are prohibited from raising
capital through equity investment. This prohibition makes it impossible for
an Opportunity Fund to satisfy its asset-holding requirements (which must
be met through equity investments) by providing capital to nonprofits. As
a result, the most straightforward way that nonprofits participate in NMTC
deals — as borrowers of loans obtained from CDEs — is completely
unavailable in Opportunity Zones transactions.
2. Absence of Monetization
A second significant barrier to nonprofit participation in Opportunity
Zones deals relates to the form of the incentive, which does not require (or
enable) monetization. There are at least two reasons why monetization
structures are not used in this context. First, tax credit monetization is used
to advance the value of future benefits to be received. However, a major
benefit under the Opportunity Zones law is the current deferral of capital
gains. That deferral is earned when taxpayers contribute the sheltered
dollars in an Opportunity Fund. No monetization is necessary.
Second, to the extent that Opportunity Zones do provide future benefits
— the exemption of post-contribution gains — those benefits are highly
speculative and not susceptible to monetization. Monetization is possible
in the context of the NMTC because the anticipated value of the tax credits
is relatively certain, as it is clearly defined by the size of a CDE’s tax credit
allocations. In contrast, the value of Opportunity Zones tax preferences
depends on how profitable an Opportunity Fund turns out to be in the
future. Investors will not be willing to contribute cash in exchange for a
benefit that may never materialize.
Without monetization, two common ways that nonprofits participate in
NMTC deals are less viable in the context of Opportunity Zones. First,
recall that nonprofits participate in NMTC deals as owners of CDEs that
solicit for-profit investors who claim the tax credits. In theory, a nonprofit
could form an Opportunity Fund to pursue its own projects — but without

102. See Stecker, supra note 45, at 350.
103. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The
Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 512–13 (2010).
104. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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monetization, many mission-driven projects will be unattractive to
investors.105 Second, recall that nonprofits participate in NMTC deals as
leverage providers. But, here too, the investors may be unwilling to pursue
mission-driven projects if they do not expect them to be profitable.
To be clear, there are no legal barriers to either of these structures.
Nevertheless, for either structure to work, the Opportunity Fund must
commit to investing in projects consistent with a nonprofit’s exempt
purpose, and investors must be willing to invest in those mission-driven
projects. Ultimately, the absence of monetization means that investors
cannot rely on monetization to produce an acceptable rate of return.
Instead, they must bet on the performance of the Opportunity Fund’s
investments. Leverage can be added to increase the profits derived from a
successful investment — but it cannot be used to hedge against the risk that
an investment may not be successful. No amount of leverage can ensure
that Opportunity Zone investors receive a return on their investment even if
the underlying investment fails.106
For this reason, investors may be reluctant to participate in transactions
with nonprofits when the mission-driven projects will be less profitable
than for-profit endeavors.107 As described below, this barrier is further
exacerbated by uncertainty surrounding the treatment of Opportunity Zone
investments under the CRA.
3. Uncertainty About CRA Credit
When a financial institution is able to claim CRA credit for a missiondriven investment, it may be willing to accept a low rate of return. In the
contexts of the NMTC and LIHTC, the CRA has proven to be highly
motivating to financial institution investors.108 However, the CRA is likely

105. See, e.g., Tracy A. Kaye, Ogden Commons Case Study: A Comparative Look at the
LIHTC and OZ Tax Incentive Programs, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2021)
(explaining that affordable housing developer, “[t]he Habitat Co., had a great deal of trouble
attracting qualified opportunity zone funding because ‘mission-oriented projects struggle to
compete for attention with higher return projects’” (citation omitted)).
106. In contrast, if enough leverage is added to an NMTC deal, an investor may receive
more value in tax credits than the size of its initial contribution. In such case, the underlying
investment could become worthless, but the investor would still receive an acceptable
return. See SBFRIEDMAN, supra note 64, at 2.
107. In fact, some observers have estimated that only about 5% to 10% of Opportunity
Funds will be operated with philanthropic or social-impact missions. See Lydia O’Neal,
Cottage Industry in Opportunity Zone Data Forms to Fill Vacuum (1), BLOOMBERG TAX
(Apr. 18, 2019, 5:04 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/cottage-industryin-opportunity-zone-data-forms-to-fill-vacuum [https://perma.cc/4SBP-FGYQ].
108. See supra notes 78−88 and accompanying text.
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to be less motivating in the Opportunity Zones context because the status of
Opportunity Zone investments under the CRA is less certain. When the
Opportunity Zones law was first introduced, there was substantial
uncertainty as to whether any Opportunity Zone investment would satisfy
CRA obligations.109 Since then, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) has issued regulations confirming that Opportunity Zone
investment may qualify under the CRA, but only if the underlying
investment is a type expected to benefit low- or moderate-income
populations.110
In the preamble to the regulations, the OCC explained that “[w]hether an
activity benefits an [low- or moderate-income (LMI)] qualified opportunity
zone will depend on the facts and circumstances of the activity, including
whether it is responsive to the needs of LMI individuals, families, and
communities in the opportunity zone.”111 Though the new regulations
provide some assurance that Opportunity Zone investment can satisfy CRA
obligations, the facts and circumstances approach makes the treatment of
such investments far less certain than in the context of the NTMC or
LIHTC.
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has yet to clarify whether Opportunity
Zone investment satisfies CRA requirements for banks under its regulatory
jurisdiction. A proposed rule published in October 2020 did not mention
Opportunity Zones,112 and some commenters have asked the agency to
“make clear that investments in Opportunity Zones . . . that align with the
intent of the Community Reinvestment Act . . . in benefitting low- and
moderate income (“LMI”) individuals and communities are eligible for
CRA credit.”113 The uncertainty about how the CRA applies to
Opportunity Fund investment creates an additional barrier to nonprofit
participation in Opportunity Zone deals. This is because it dulls an
incentive that could otherwise help induce financial institutions to

109. See Bob Ibanez, Opportunity Zones — Giving CRA Credit Where Credit Is Due,
NOVOGRADAC (Nov. 13, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-fromnovogradac/opportunity-zones-giving-cra-credit-where-credit-due [https://perma.cc/V6ZJAY53].
110. See Qualifying Activities Criteria, 12 C.F.R. § 25.04(c)(11) (2021).
111. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,734, 34,747 (June 5,
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 195).
112. See generally Community Reinvestment Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 66,410 (proposed Oct.
19, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228).
113. Letter from Catherine Lyons, Dir. of Pol’y & Coals., Econ. Innovation Grp., to Anne
E. Misback, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. 1 (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/EIG-OZ-Coalition-Comment-Letter-on-CRAANPR-2.16.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/SP3T-N66T].
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participate in deals involving nonprofits, notwithstanding the economic
risks.114
Thus, the Opportunity Zones incentive is unlikely to be used to support
the activities of nonprofits — and this may significantly limit the program’s
potential to benefit low-income communities. In short, the mission-driven
investment that is relatively common under the NMTC program is simply
unlikely to be seen to the same degree in the context of Opportunity Zones.
C. Layering Opportunity Zones and the NMTC
At least one other option remains for nonprofits to participate in
Opportunity Funds deals: layer Opportunity Zones with the NMTC. An
important commonality between Opportunity Zones and NMTC is that the
programs significantly overlap in the places that they target. The
Opportunity Zones statute made all NMTC-eligible tracts eligible for
Opportunity Zone designation, as well as certain contiguous census tracts
and tracts located in Empowerment Zones.115 A subset of those eligible
tracts were designated by state governors as Qualified Opportunity
Zones.116 As a result, a significant number of Qualified Opportunity Zones
are also NMTC eligible.117
Because many census tracts are eligible for both NMTC and Opportunity
Zone investment, the two incentives are occasionally paired.118 For
example, it is possible for a CDE to meet the definition of a Qualified
Opportunity Fund if it satisfies the asset holding requirements.119

114. However, note that even with CRA credit, many financial institutions may be unable
to participate in Opportunity Zones deals because they typically do not have capital gains to
invest in Opportunity Funds. See Dirk Wallace & Michael Novogradac, Treasury Should
Revise Opportunity Zones Guidance to Encourage Affordable Rental Housing,
NOVOGRADAC (Sept. 30, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-fromnovogradac/treasury-should-revise-opportunity-zones-guidance-encourage-affordablerental-housing [https://perma.cc/WV4L-QKK3]; see also Layser, Financing Affordable
Housing, supra note 92.
115. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e).
116. See I.R.S. Notice 2018-48, I.R.B. 2018-28. While the I.R.S notice notes a state’s
Chief Executive Officer may nominate census tracts, a state’s Chief Executive Officer is the
state governor. See LOWRY & MARPLES, supra note 98, at 1 (stating that a state’s chief
executive officer is “generally the governor”).
117. See Brian Blacker, Stacked Incentives: NMTC Eligibility and Opportunity Zones,
POLICYMAP (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.policymap.com/2019/09/stacked-incentivesnmtc-eligibility-and-opportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ6Q-DN77].
118. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 15, at 26.
119. See George Barlow & John Sciarretti, Pairing NMTCs with Opportunity Zone
Incentives,
NOVOGRADAC
(Apr.
5,
2018),
https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/pairing-nmtcs-opportunity-zone-incentives
[https://perma.cc/3R4N-6UXH].
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Alternatively, it may be possible for an Opportunity Fund to create its own
CDE subsidiary, in which the CDE meets the definition of a qualified
opportunity zone business. In these cases, nonprofits may be able to
participate in the transaction in the same ways that they would participate
in any other NMTC deal.
However, “CDEs seeking to pair OZ incentives with NMTCs will be
required to make their qualified low-income community investments
(QLICIs) in the form of equity investments . . . which may not be generally
consistent with their approved business strategy.”120 Since most CDEs
specialize in loans, the CDE may need to seek approval from the CDFI
Fund in order to make these equity investments.121 At a minimum, these
transactions will be more complicated than deals that use only one
incentive, requiring more advisors — and higher expenses — to close the
deals. For these reasons, it is unlikely that investors will seek to pair the
incentives often enough to create significant opportunities for nonprofits to
participate in Opportunity Zones deals.
CONCLUSION
When tax incentives are designed in ways that create opportunities for
nonprofits to participate in investments, a wide variety of mission-driven
investments can be supported. This Essay has analyzed nonprofit
participation in NMTC transactions in order to gain insights into the
barriers to nonprofit participation in Opportunity Zones investment. It has
identified several barriers, including the requirement that Opportunity
Funds make equity investments, the absence of monetization structures,
and uncertainty about how the investments will be treated under the CRA.
Together, these barriers make it more difficult for nonprofits to participate
in Opportunity Zone deals.
This is not to say that nonprofits never participate in Opportunity Zone
deals or that Opportunity Funds are never mission-driven. To the contrary,
philanthropies and other nonprofits do participate in Opportunity Zones
deals, and some Opportunity Fund investors are highly committed to
mission-driven investment.122 Nevertheless, this Essay has demonstrated
that the design of the tax incentive makes it more difficult for nonprofits to
participate in Opportunity Zones deals than in NMTC deals, despite

120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See generally THEODOS ET AL., supra note 15 (describing the use of Opportunity
Zones for mission-driven investment); Kaye, supra note 105 (describing how an affordable
housing project was financed using Opportunity Fund equity).
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similarities between the two incentives. For this reason, it is likely that the
mix of investments subsidized through the Opportunity Zones law will
include fewer mission-driven projects than what could be promoted under
an alternate tax incentive design.
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APPENDIX A
Type Codes
Apartments/Condos

Community Center

Education

Grocery
Homeless/Social Services

Manufacturing/Wholesale

Medical

Museum/Theater/Arts
Office Space

Retail/Restaurants

Includes:
Construction of for-sale or rental housing, Mixed-use
residential buildings, Mixed-income housing, Singlefamily residence
Family centers, community gardens, youth centers,
recreation centers, church community centers,
Salvation Army community centers, YMCA
community centers, Boys & Girls Club community
centers
Charter schools, childcare/early learning centers,
schools for the disabled, libraries, university buildings,
children’s science centers, after-school programs
Full-service grocery stores, butcher shops, food co-ops
Homeless shelters, job training centers for low-income
people, employment agencies for low-income people,
Religious missions, social-services nonprofits,
family/youth services, food kitchens, disability support
services, anti-poverty organizations, housing assistance
organizations, nonprofit law centers, homeless
services, anti-addiction nonprofits, assisted living
facilities
Manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, warehouse
storage space, industrial tenants, meat packers, food
distribution, food catering
Medical facilities, rehab centers, Diabetes relief clinics,
pharmacies, specialized medical clinics, family health
centers, HIV/AIDS clinics, health and wellness centers
(excluding recreation centers), health literacy centers,
health and wellness centers for the elderly, hospitals,
medical transit, medical supply stores
Performing arts centers, concert halls, fine art centers,
cultural museums, art museums, galleries
Office buildings, office space (unknown tenants),
creative community space (e.g., makers space / small
business owners)
Malls, strip malls, small retailers, restaurants, fast food,
auto repair, financial services (e.g., banks)
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Hotels, laboratories, events facilities, bus terminals,
transportation services, self-storage facilities, military
tenants, business community centers, shipping docks,
movie/production studios, recording studios, funeral
homes, dog spas
Property use inconclusive based on Google Satellite
images and Google searches of address

Unknown

APPENDIX B
Year

y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7

Tax
Credit per
Dollar QEI

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06

NMTC Value as a Percentage of Taxpayer’s Equity
Contribution
Non-Leveraged
Leveraged Structure
Structure
($0.31 equity + $0.69
($1 equity + $0 debt)
debt)
5%
16%
5%
16%
5%
16%
6%
19%
6%
19%
6%
19%
6%
19%
APPENDIX C

Figure 1: Sample NMTC Structures Engaging Nonprofits

